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Abstract
In part one of this paper I discuss how issues of combatant misconduct and illegality have led military 
academies to become more focused on professionalism rather than on the tensions between military 
ethics and military training. In order to interrogate the relationships between training and ethics, between 
becoming a military professional and being a military professional, between military professionals and 
society, I turn to the work of Martin Cook, Anthony Hartle, and J. Glenn Gray. In part two I focus on Cook’s 
analysis of the conflict between the self-understanding and the expected behavior of military professionals. 
In part three I focus on Hartle’s analysis of how the experience of alienation by military professionals can 
help to create the culture of military professionals. In part four I introduce a new theory of professionalism 
based on the existential and phenomenological philosophy of J. Glenn Gray, which can help us to better 
understand the philosophical and psychological stakes of what it means to become a military professional. I 
conclude in part five by suggesting that the most pressing issue in the military is not a lack of professionalism, 
but a lack of trust.
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Introduction
Ethical and legal violations by military professionals—whether a “tragedy” (Wilson 
2008, 33), “highly publicized allegations of unlawful acts” (Mileham 2008, 44), a “scan-
dal” (Cook 2008, 58), a “critical event” (Desjardins 2008, 69), “serious operational 
incidents” (Cullens 2008, 79), or “military excesses” (Werdelis 2008, 103)—have cre-
ated a fear that there is a crisis of unprofessionalism pervading the militaries of the 
Western world. To address this crisis, military academies have undertaken a process of 
self-examination in order to determine what is either missing or has gone wrong in the 
professionalization process such that these and other similar violations are occurring. 
The primary answer that has arisen is that ethics education needs to be improved, and 
improved by offering more courses and more training in military ethics and in just war 
theory (Hartle 1989; Cook 2004; Robinson, de Lee, and Carrick 2008).
Such an answer makes sense of course insofar as it is simply common sense that the 
way to resolve unethical behavior is by finding ways to better inculcate ethics into those 
who are misbehaving. The question that should concern us however is whether these 
violations are indeed due to a lack of ethics by military professionals or instead due to 
the kind of ethics being taught to military professionals. In other words, if these viola-
tions are a result of the ethical teaching and training already present in the military, 
then to increase rather than question this ethical teaching and training will not only 
do nothing to resolve these violations, but perpetuate them at worst or modify their 
expression at best.
It is this latter possibility that makes interrogating ethics so difficult. For if humans 
only responded to external pressure in one way—by, for example, committing ethi-
cal and legal violations—then we would need merely to count the incidences of such 
violations in order to determine which approaches work and which do not. However, 
humans have a variety of ways to “discharge” (Nietzsche 1989) our immoral instincts, 
“sublimate” (Freud 1989) our uncivilized desires, or, as we more often say, to “blow off 
steam.” Indeed, as has been argued recently under the heading of “moral injury” (Brock 
and Lettini 2012), not only ethical and legal violations, but even what is diagnosed as 
PTSD, could be seen as extreme versions of how members of the military respond to 
the conflicts experienced between the demands of military ethics and the demands of 
the military profession.
In other words, lack of professionalism in the military could be understood to be either 
an ethical issue or a psychological issue, to be resolved either by better training or by 
better treatment. In this paper I will propose a third way to understand this lack of 
professionalism by exploring these ethical and legal violations as an existential issue. By 
viewing what it means to be a professional, and in particular a military professional, as 
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an identity, as a way of being in the world, then we can begin to see these violations as 
resulting not from a lack of ethics, nor from a trauma, but from a conflict between who 
one has been trained to become and who one is. Whereas ethical approaches to military 
professionalism can exacerbate this conflict, and psychological approaches to military 
professionalism can retroactively help to manage this conflict, an existential approach 
can instead help us to better understand and perhaps even to proactively avoid this 
conflict.
In order to develop this existential approach to understanding the conflicts between 
military professionalization and the experience of being a military professional, I will 
examine the work of Martin Cook, Anthony Hartle, and J. Glenn Gray, as all three illu-
minate different aspects of these conflicts. I will begin with Cook (2004), who criticizes 
military professionalization from an Aristotelian perspective, focusing on the superfi-
ciality of the efforts of military academies to train military professionals to act ethically 
without also attempting to train military professionals to reflect on what it means to 
be ethical. While Cook points to a vital disparity between who a military professional 
is supposed to be and who a military professional is, in the next section I will turn to 
Hartle (1989), who deepens this disparity by describing what it is like to be a military 
professional. In particular Hartle helps to illuminate the dynamic of how the tensions 
between military professionals and the rest of society in part produces the culture of 
the military profession, a dynamic which creates the identity of a military professional. 
I will then turn to Gray (1968), who examines the military professional’s identity from 
an existential-phenomenological perspective. Gray argues, like Cook, that military pro-
fessionalization is too superficially focused on habit formation, but goes further than 
Cook by arguing that what is missing is not only Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, but 
more importantly something resembling Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean, what Gray 
calls “artistic morality” (Gray 1968, 100). In the concluding section of this paper I will 
attempt to develop this concept of “artistic morality” in order to show how it can help 
us to better understand what’s missing from our current approaches to military profes-
sionalism.
Trust Us, We’re Professionals
In The Moral Warrior (2004), Cook is concerned primarily with examining how the 
concept of “professionalism” has been deployed without its having been first “examined 
critically” (Cook 2004, 56), such that military professionals could be expected to be 
simultaneously obedient tools of the state, and yet also uniquely talented and skilled 
members of the state whose particular expertise is necessary for the state’s continued 
existence. It is owing to this perspective towards the military that Cook believes that, 
on the one hand, members of the military have been wrongly accused of being “unpro-
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fessional” for being hesitant to blindly obey orders, and, on the other hand, members of 
the military have wrongly been resistant to adapt to changing circumstances because of 
their view of what it means to be “military professionals.”
Having in mind the failure of military professionals during the Vietnam War to make 
use of their expertise and knowledge to advise politicians to avoid disastrous military 
policies, Cook is trying to demarcate the important differences between obedience, 
hesitancy, and obstinacy. To do this, Cook argues against those (Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff 
1999) who would compare the military profession to the service industry, with the 
idea that anything less than giving the client what he or she wants (e.g., “service with a 
smile”) is seen as acting “unprofessionally.” Instead, Cook advocates for comparing the 
military to the medical and legal professions, as it is understood that doctors and law-
yers ought to use their skills as they think best because their unique training and expe-
rience enables them to have a better grasp of where their skills are best and least suited. 
Hence Cook wants us to move away from seeing the military’s recent emphasis on 
“force protection” (Cook 2004, 69) as an external question of the military’s profession-
alism or unprofessionalism, and instead as a question that must be asked from within 
the military’s self-understanding of what it means to be a “military professional.” In 
other words, the military’s “professionalism” cannot be properly judged in cases where 
orders are not simply and immediately carried out without first investigating how 
members of the military understand their roles and obligations so that we can properly 
see that “prudent disinclination, like intellectual independence, may be a manifestation 
of professional seriousness, not a lack of it” (Cook 2004, 65).
It is thus the apparent contradiction between the soldier’s traditional self-under-
standing, which requires that we respect the meaning of obedience for soldiers before 
passing judgment on their willingness to obey, and the recent trend of soldiers to be 
more concerned with “force protection” than completing the missions they have been 
assigned, that leads Cook to examine how this self-understanding can motivate both 
obedience and resistance. The key, according to Cook, for seeing through this tension is 
to recognize how developments in the world of political and military affairs—namely, 
the demise of the Soviet Union and of both the type of threat it represented and the 
consequent type of military it required to be constructed in response—has led to a con-
flict between what it means to become a military professional and what it means to be 
a military professional, a conflict that had not formerly existed. To become a military 
professional, much like becoming a professional in any field, is, as Cook describes, to 
“imbibe” a knowledge, language, set of customs and mannerisms that are both shared 
in the present and have a history behind them such that professionals can be recog-
nized and distinguished from either non-professionals or “para-professionals” (Cook 
2004, 67).
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However, the “warrior ethos” that this way of being is aiming at and preparing the mili-
tary professional for is at odds with the present demands placed on military profession-
als; demands that require the skills of a police officer or humanitarian aid worker far 
more than the skills of a warrior. The feeling of this conflict between who the military 
professional was meant to be (with regard to training) and who the military profession-
al is required to be (with regard to the present geo-political situation) is captured for 
Cook in the oft-heard refrain of military professionals: “this isn’t what I signed up for” 
(Cook 2004, 69). It is this feeling of not being able to be who one was meant to become 
that has resulted in the current confusion between what is professional or unprofes-
sional and between what is obedience, hesitancy, or obstinacy.
Just as Cook wants us to see this problem from within the perspective of the military, 
so too does Cook want us to see that the solution to this problem must be sought from 
the military itself as well. Here, in this earlier work, Cook provides little indication of 
how the military ought to resolve this tension other than by finding the “intellectual 
creativity” or “intellectual flexibility” necessary to move from having to “cling desper-
ately” to an anachronistic self-understanding to instead “embrac[ing] fully the need to 
lead in its own adaptation to that environment” (Cook 2004, 76-77). However, in his 
more recent work, Cook helpfully provides an indication of how the military is meant 
to achieve this adaptability by being able to develop early on not only the habits neces-
sary to serve in the military but also the ability to reflect on the meaning and purpose 
of those habits through “phronesis,” or “practical wisdom” (Cook 2008, 58).
Yet even if Cook were to succeed in expanding the definition of “military professional-
ism” to include not only behaving like a professional but also understanding why one 
ought to behave like a professional, the corresponding change in the curriculum of mili-
tary academies would only appear to require offering more of the philosophy classes 
already available and offering them earlier rather than later:
So what can one realistically hope for at this stage?  First, one can still work on the 
formation of habits. As Aristotle so well argued, if we can form strong habits and beliefs 
about what is right and wrong, even if the reasons are not well understood, that is an 
invaluable and necessary foundation for later development and more explicitly ratio-
nal ethical analysis. Second, we can motivate cadets and inculcate high moral ideals 
by means of the non-rational appeals to emotion and role models to emulate which, at 
its best moments, the Character Development Center’s efforts provide. Lastly, we can 
begin laying the foundation in a core philosophy class which, if effective, at least dem-
onstrates that a method of systematic and rational analysis of ethical matters exists, and 
perhaps motivate them to explore those questions further as they gain the experience 
of mature officers. (Cook 2008, 65)
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While such changes might better enable military professionals to “adapt” to changing 
circumstances because they might be better able to understand the behavior that is 
expected of them, it is not at all clear that these changes would also enable an adapta-
tion in the sense of being able to remove the aforementioned tension between this 
expected behavior and the military’s self-understanding. Instead it would appear that 
rather than the “multilateral negotiation” (Cook 2004, 66) for how to adapt that Cook 
recommends on the model of medical and legal professionals, we have not moved far 
from the unilateral “service with a smile” model (Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff 1999) Cook 
criticized. Though the “smile” may now be more self-imposed than simply demanded 
by the expectations of superiors, there still remains even under Cook’s model a dispar-
ity between the behavior and the self-understanding of a military professional.
We’re Professionals, But Please Trust Us
The reason for this disparity is that the problem encapsulated for Cook in the expres-
sion “this isn’t what I signed up for” cannot be resolved by merely getting military 
professionals to see for themselves the connection between their oath of service and the 
current nature of their service (e.g., that police work and humanitarian aid do contrib-
ute to the protection of the state and its citizens). Cook is right to point out that the 
questions surrounding military professionalism cannot be answered by only follow-
ing the Aristotelian model of habit formation through pleasure and pain and through 
the use of role models, thereby forgetting that Aristotle also saw the need for practical 
wisdom for the proper implementation of those habits once they have been initially 
formed. However what appears to be missing from Cook’s account of professionaliza-
tion is a focus on what distinguishes the military profession from the medical and legal 
professions, for, as Samuel P. Huntington described in his classic The Soldier and the 
State, “the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer” (Huntington 1957, 
11). In other words, if Cook’s proposal is that military professionals are being trained 
through habit formation and role models but need to be better trained in ethics, then 
military professionals are being trained in how to be violent, but need to be better 
trained in raising questions like whether it is right to be violent. Consequently, ethi-
cal and legal violations by military professionals, the suffering of military profession-
als diagnosed as PTSD, might not be due to a lack of ethics, but to a conflict between 
violence and ethics, the conflict encapsulated by just war theory’s demand that military 
professionals be violent in an ethical way (Gertz 2014).
Given the gravity of the problems of “professional disillusionment, lowered morale, and 
diminished sense of commitment to the profession” (Cook 2004, 68) that Cook finds 
among current members of the military, it would seem that we should be wary of any 
possible reductive understandings of the meaning of becoming a military professional, 
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particularly understandings that reduce the role that violence plays in being a military 
professional. It is the tension between becoming and being a military professional, and 
the related tension between military professionals and the rest of the society, that we 
find in the work of Anthony Hartle and—as I will discuss in the next section—in the 
work of J. Glenn Gray.
According to Hartle, one becomes a professional, whether a doctor or a soldier, due to 
what has traditionally been referred to as a “calling” (Hartle 1989, 20), such that a doc-
tor or soldier could say that he or she was called to serve either her society or humanity 
and can often even remember a specific event earlier in life that led her to feel so called. 
To feel called is to be both connected to others who have likewise been called and 
disconnected from others who have not. This connection and disconnection therefore 
create the grounds for a profession at the same time as they create a distance between 
the profession and the rest of society. Hence even though the profession is comprised 
of those who feel they have been called to serve society there is nevertheless a distance 
that separates the professionals and the rest of society such that the former can feel 
both morally superior to (Hartle 1989, 19) and alienated (Hartle 1989, 22) by the latter, 
while the latter can feel both a need for and distrust of the former.
The tensions experienced between profession and society serve to similarly distance 
and distinguish the unity, “corporateness” (Huntington 1957, 10), or “culture” (Hartle 
1989, 19), belonging to both. In the same way that different societies set themselves 
apart by their cultural differences, so too do professions set themselves apart from both 
other professions and from the society they serve. However, whereas a society can often 
be set apart from other societies more by geography than by choice, with the resultant 
culture created more by accident and time than by a feeling of unity, a profession, as we 
have seen, is distinguished instead by unity, such that its culture is more concrete and 
recognizable. Indeed it could further be said that the stronger the unity experienced 
by members of the profession (and, correspondingly, the stronger the disunity with the 
rest of society), the more powerful and pervasive the culture of the profession.
For there to be such a correlation between identity and culture—as is found in the 
military profession far more than in the medical or legal professions (Hartle 1989, 
20)—there must be something that the members of the profession receive from their 
cultural bonds to each other that they are not receiving otherwise because of their lack 
of social bonds to those outside the profession. A clue to what this something might 
be can be found if we return to Cook. According to Cook, one source of the current 
disillusionment experienced by military professionals can be found in their having 
lost their “jurisdiction” (Cook 2004, 59). Hence as we move from a state of affairs that 
calls for large-scale warfare to situations that require humanitarian interventions, the 
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military in turn becomes reduced not only in size and function but also in the nature 
of its mission and ability to determine how to carry out that mission. Cook likens this 
post-Westphalian situation that the military currently finds itself in to a situation where 
surgeons are no longer required. Thus, in the same way that surgeons, if they were con-
fronted with irrelevancy or redundancy, could either adapt and find new ways to make 
use of their training and expertise or choose not to adapt and let others more willing to 
adapt take over their jurisdiction, Cook argues that the military has to similarly adapt or 
get out of the way. The disillusionment experienced by military professionals is thus seen 
by Cook as simply a natural consequence of finding oneself in such a time of transition 
and confusion.
I believe that this phenomenon of disillusionment operates at a much deeper, existen-
tial level than Cook describes. For if we return to the idea of a professional as someone 
whose identity is determined largely by the feeling of being called to serve, and who in 
turn feels united with others who have similarly been called while feeling separated from 
those who have not, then we can see that one’s professional “jurisdiction” is far more 
meaningful than merely serving as the bounded region of one’s authority. To be who one 
is, to live in accordance with the way of life that one feels is most appropriate for oneself, 
can and should be understood by the concept of freedom in both a positive and negative 
sense. Hence, as Rousseau and Kant argued, we are free insofar as we can live according 
to laws of our own making and without having to live in accordance with laws imposed 
on us by others. Where one can thus live freely, by one’s own laws and not by the laws of 
those who would want to live differently (e.g., in accordance with the laws of those who 
are not defined by their being “peculiarly expert at directing the application of violence 
under certain prescribed conditions” (Huntington 1957, 12)), is more than to be within 
one’s own jurisdiction, but to be at home, or, as Carl Schmitt (2003, 52) argued, to have 
jurisdiction is what it means to be at home.
I would argue therefore that what Cook is here referring to as “jurisdiction” can be more 
usefully understood as a manifestation of the need to feel at home in the world, and it is 
this feeling that one both loses (with regards to society) and gains (with regards to the 
profession) in becoming a military professional. Though by “home” we typically mean 
nothing more than a “place to hang one’s hat,” and thus can say that one’s “need” for a 
home is nothing more than a need for a place to be free from the elements or protected 
from intruders, there is a more fundamental “need to feel at home in the world” that 
I am referring to here. This need manifests itself, for example, in the common rituals 
of decorating that we tend to engage in when we want to make a new space “feel like 
home,” such as surrounding oneself with photographs of friends and family or with vari-
ous keepsakes and knickknacks from memorable events in one’s past, all of which can be 
used to try to hide, if not replace, the alien character of the unfamiliar.
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However, as can be seen if we look to Dan Baum’s New Yorker article “The Price of 
Valor” (2004), for a military professional such attempts to find or re-create a home 
away from home can manifest themselves in a radically different manner.  Baum writes:
Debbie watched the waitress clear our plates, then she leaned forward to tell about a 
night in July, after Carl’s return, when they went with some friends to the Afterhours 
Enlisted Club at Fort Benning.  Carl had a few drinks, Debbie said, and started railing 
at the disk jockey, shouting, “I want to hear music about people blowing people’s brains 
out, cutting people’s throats!”  Debbie continued, “I said, ‘Carl. Shut up.’  He said, ‘No, 
I want to hear music about shit I’ve seen!’”  Carl listened to Debbie’s story with a lov-
ing smile, as though she were telling about him losing his car keys.  “I don’t remember 
that,” he said, laughing. (Baum 2004, 44-45)
It is tempting to see in such an account a description of classic symptoms of PTSD—
such as hyperarousal, intrusive memories, avoidance, and emotional numbing—how-
ever I believe it is more useful and more revelatory to see this instead as an instance 
of what Heidegger refers to as the feeling of “uncanniness” [unheimlichkeit], of liter-
ally “not-being-at-home” (Heidegger 1962, 233). While this suggestion would seem 
to contradict the fact that this episode occurred after Carl had returned home from 
Iraq, I would argue that his need to hear such music, music specifically about “people 
blowing people’s brains out, cutting people’s throats,” points to the conclusion that Carl 
no longer experiences his home as home, but as alien, a place that urges him towards, 
paradoxically, the security and comfort of war (Baum 2004, 52).
It is precisely this apparent paradox, this experience of peace as alien and of war as 
home, that requires that we interrogate rather than take for granted the relationship 
between training and ethics in military professionalization. For example, in his para-
digmatic just war theory text Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer claims that there 
is a distinction between “ordinary soldiers” and “wholehearted soldiers” (Walzer 1977, 
162), as the “ordinary” are like us and only want to return home, while the “whole-
hearted” are not like us and are instead obsessed with war. Walzer further claims that 
this distinction is rooted in “common morality” (Walzer 1977, xxii), and is thus not his 
perspective on soldiers, but rather the common sense perspective on soldiers, a per-
spective that belongs to society such that to disagree with this perspective is, as Walzer 
makes clear (Walzer 1977, xxii), to be seen as not only immoral but inhuman.
For someone like Carl, a military professional, this perspective reveals both how the 
military professional ought to experience war and how society ought to judge military 
professionals. It should not surprise us therefore that military professionals who do not 
identify with the “wholehearted soldier,” but who recognize—from, for example, having 
taken ethics courses during their professionalization process—that society would iden-
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tify them as a “wholehearted soldier,” would prefer silence to storytelling, the military 
to society, and war to peace. Yet this apparent paradox does surprise us, and indeed 
surprises us so much that we find this behavior of military professionals to be patholog-
ical, to be symptomatic of either immorality (e.g., Augustine’s “lust for war”) or of PTSD 
(e.g., hyperarousal, emotional numbing, and avoidance).
We can now see that something vital is missed when we either take for granted that 
there is one moral world such that we could simply put ourselves in their shoes in order 
to understand the experiences of military professionals (as Walzer does), or when we 
tell military professionals to expand their minds so as to better adapt to an ever-chang-
ing world (as Cook does). In order to find what is missing from such views of military 
professionalism, I will next turn to J. Glenn Gray, and his argument for an “artistic 
morality” (Gray 1968, 98). What Gray envisions is a new way of education based on a 
return to Aristotle’s ethics. However, unlike the so-called return to Aristotle of mili-
tary academies or even of Cook, Gray would have us remember that Aristotle’s ethics 
included, along with habit formation and practical wisdom, a call for standards of the 
good that would start from the individual and move towards the communal, rather than 
communal conceptions of the good being forced upon individuals. In other words, what 
has been left out of the versions of Aristotelian ethics found in military academies, and 
even in Cook’s criticisms of those academies, is Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean.
The Need for “Soldier-Artists”
A thread that runs through the work of J. Glenn Gray, from The Warriors (1959) to 
The Promise of Wisdom (1968), is the tension between the individual and society. Gray 
opens The Warriors with precisely the worry that I presented at the end of the previous 
section: the worry that society misjudges military professionals, that there is a grow-
ing “dissociation in our lives between soldiering and civilian pursuits” such that society 
increasingly views the military professional as “a criminal, a murderer” (Gray 1959, 
xvi). In a vein similar to Hartle, Gray argues that military professionals can experience 
dimensions of conscience typically unknown to the rest of society. It is this idea that 
different individuals can experience different levels of conscientiousness due to having 
been exposed to different experiences that leads Gray to argue that individuals can only 
judge themselves, not others. Gray writes:
The greater the possibility of free action in the communal sphere, the greater the degree 
of guilt for evil deeds done in the name of everyone. Still, the degrees of guilt are im-
possible to assess for anyone else, and hardly any two people share an equal burden of 
communal guilt. […] No citizen of a free land can justly accuse his neighbor, I believe, 
of political guilt, of not having done as much as he should to prevent the state of war or 
the commission of this or that state crime. But each can—and the man of conscience 
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will—accuse himself in proportion to the freedom he had to alter the course of events. 
(Gray 1959, 199)
Walzer adopts Gray’s criterion for determining responsibility by determining freedom 
of action, but rejects Gray’s caveat that we each must only judge ourselves and not each 
other. Walzer argues that Gray’s view is simply untenable, that “that kind of self-regard 
is not possible in politics and morality” (Walzer 1977, 298), for, as we have already 
seen, Walzer grounds just war theory in the presumed existence of a common morality.
And indeed it surely seems as though Walzer must be right here, that we cannot forego 
ethical judgment and simply trust each other to hold ourselves accountable. Yet Gray 
returns to this theme again in The Promise of Wisdom, for it is in this later text that 
Gray not only continues his advocacy for individual over social accountability, but pro-
vides an argument for how to rethink education in order to promote individual rather 
than merely social accountability. The reason Gray focuses on the individual is due to 
what he perceives to be a crisis in moral life, a crisis created by the shift from a religious 
to a secular society, not unlike the crisis Cook perceives in the shift in the military due 
to the transition from the Cold War to the War on Terror. With religious values con-
tinuing to lose their prominence in serving as the standard for judging what is appro-
priate, Gray worries that individuals are caught between the extreme of determining 
what is appropriate by egotistically pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and the op-
posite extreme of determining what is appropriate by blindly conforming to whatever 
society judges to be appropriate (Gray 1968, 101-102).
Gray locates the mean between these two extremes through a return to the Ancient 
Greek concept of “artistry,” not in the sense of painting and writing, but in the sense 
of “the art of good living” (Gray 1968, 98). Though Gray is here returning to an Aris-
totelian ethics of engagement, it is Socrates who serves as Gray’s model of ethical life. 
Gray focuses in particular on the Socrates of Plato’s Symposium, who was described by 
Alcibiades as not only a great teacher who could “think well and communicate his ideas 
in fascinating style,” but also as someone who was virtuous in war, in public, and in 
private, who could “act well in the trials of existence” (Gray 1968, 99). It is precisely this 
ability to determine for oneself what is appropriate in any given situation that Gray sees 
as the truest meaning of aretē, of virtue, of what Aristotle was ultimately advocating be-
yond simply having good habits and the ability to reflect on why such habits are good.
To achieve this artistic individuality, Gray argues that certain conditions are necessary, 
not only on an individual but also on a social level. Having distinguished artistic indi-
viduality from both individualism and conventionalism, the artistic individual needs, on 
the one hand, the ability to overcome the individual pressures of hedonism, and on the 
other hand, the ability to overcome the social pressures of conformity. In reference to 
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overcoming the pressures of hedonism, Gray argues, not unlike Aristotle and Mill, that 
artistic individuality rather than egotistic individualism can be achieved through expo-
sure to a variety of experiences. In order not to ignore pleasure and pain, but to discov-
er for oneself the most meaningful ways of experiencing pleasure and pain, Gray argues 
that individuals must be exposed to a variety of literature (Gray 1968, 100), to genuine 
rather than hypocritical role models (Gray 1968, 101), and to “the hazards of uncon-
trolled experience” as it is only through experiencing “the extremes of human conduct” 
that we can “discover dimensions of the self we never suspected” (Gray 1968, 105). 
Reading fiction and poetry, rather than just STEM textbooks, can expand one’s moral 
imagination. Having role models who are committed to an artistic way of life, rather 
than role models who have merely been successful, can improve one’s morale and 
deepen one’s resolve. Being exposed to the chaos of the world and being trusted to 
responsibly navigate it, rather than being sheltered from reality and from responsibility, 
can awaken one’s conscience and reveal one’s humanity.
In reference to overcoming the pressures of conformity, Gray argues that, due to the 
nature of one’s community, it can be difficult to distinguish an individual who is rebel-
lious from an individual who is repressed, much like how Cook argued that we need to 
try to distinguish disobedience due to a perceived lack of professionalism from hesi-
tancy due to professionalism. Gray writes:
When a local community is reasonably tolerant and appreciative of diversity, it is usu-
ally possible for a youth seeking artistry in conduct to behave within the confines of 
the permissible. […] But in a social order that has failed to change, where conformity 
has become a compulsive force and personal freedom is threatened, the individual has 
no choice but openly to oppose the ruling powers. His sense of the fitting would be in 
conscious opposition to conventional standards. In the last analysis, the interests of in-
dividual integrity always precede the claims of social order. Artistry in conduct cannot 
reconcile itself to dictation from without, whether it be religious, political, or simply 
the imagined requirements of a socially dominant majority. In short, the conventional 
and the appropriate may travel parallel roads and often intersect, but they rarely coin-
cide for long. (Gray 1968, 103)
Individuals are capable, when given the space to experiment, to determine for them-
selves an appropriate way to live. But when not given such space, when forced instead 
to conform, individual attempts to determine how to be virtuous can appear to others 
to simply be attempts at disobedience. Given, as we have seen, both the lack of trust on 
the part of Walzer and just war theorists, and the drive to inculcate habits on the part 
of military academies and military ethicists, Gray would likely not be surprised that 
military professionals have been discovered committing ethical and legal violations or 
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diagnosed with PTSD. As Gray warns, we must “recognize the necessity for continuous 
evolution in the moral sphere, both in the individual and in society,” for the alterna-
tive is training individuals to become “a person who obeys rigid rules of conduct and 
attempts to apply them indiscriminately to the enormous variety of circumstances and 
personalities he confronts,” to become a person who is “moralistic rather than moral” 
(Gray 1968, 103-104).
While it may be argued that military professionals are being provided with opportuni-
ties to experience the “escape” that Gray advocates “from the security of wealth and 
comfort, fond guardians, and the protective environment of pedagogues and books” 
(Gray 1968, 105), they are not being provided with the other side of this education, the 
side that would allow these military professionals to properly learn from their experi-
ence. For along with the experience necessary to discover who and what one is, Gray 
likewise advocates for education to include learning how to reflect on their experience, 
as “unless one learns how to reflect on these experiences, the peculiar kind of self-
knowledge required for moral skill will fail” (Gray 1968, 105).
It is important to clarify here though that by “reflection” Gray is not calling for military 
professionals to learn practical wisdom in the sense meant by Cook discussed earlier. 
What Gray argues for is neither learning the intellectual abilities of “logical sharpness” 
and “contemplation” (Gray 1968, 106) required of a “soldier-scholar” (Cook 2004, 
73), nor learning the values of a “Stoic warrior” of “detachment” and “dissociation” 
(Sherman 2005, 166), nor learning to think of morality as a “burden…in opposition 
to all natural inclinations” (Gray 1968, 108) as would be expected of just war theory’s 
“soldier-ethicist” (Kilner 2011). Instead, what Gray believes is necessary to accompany 
a military professional’s experiences would be to learn to become a soldier-artist, to 
develop an “awareness” (Gray 1968, 106) of the relationship between the individual and 
the world; a “discipline of will” (Gray 1968, 107) for being actively responsible rather 
than idly waiting for events to occur; and a “style in living” and “imagination” in order 
to have the flexibility and “radical openness” (Gray 1969, 108) to respond to the spon-
taneous and novel nature of experience.
At this point it may be argued against Gray, much as Walzer did, that he is advocat-
ing for a moral education that is simply too abstract and too subjective to be put into 
practice. And yet Gray would indeed agree with this assessment, as his point is pre-
cisely that morality, a morality that is not merely a robotic moralism, cannot be taught. 
As Gray writes, “There is widespread agreement that these virtues, of which we have 
been speaking, are incapable of being taught in the manner that traditional subject 
matter is capable of being taught. Still, many things which are not teachable are nev-
ertheless able to be learned” (Gray 1968, 113). It is this distinction between what can 
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be taught and what can be learned that Gray is advocating above all else, for it is only 
by allowing individuals the necessary freedom and opportunity to grow—a freedom 
and opportunity that must include the ability to fail and to learn from one’s mistakes 
(Gray 1968, 193)—that an individual can truly become virtuous. Gray neverthe-
less suggests, as we have seen, practical methods for providing individuals with the 
opportunity to grow, such as through exposure to a greater variety of literature, a 
greater variety of role models, and a greater variety of experiences than is typically 
found in education, let alone in military academies. Yet above all Gray is challenging 
us to do precisely what Walzer asserts is impossible, to trust individuals to be capable 
of judging themselves rather than training individuals to associate morality with a 
fear of being judged by others, a fear that, as I have argued, can produce ethical and 
legal violations in some instances, and PTSD (or, as I have argued elsewhere (Gertz 
2014), what is diagnosed as PTSD could instead be seen as the existential experience 
of exile) in others.
Conclusion
In the first section of this paper I argued that what has been seen as a crisis in mili-
tary professionalism, a crisis due to ethical and legal violations committed by military 
professionals, required that we interrogate rather than take for granted the relation-
ship between training and ethics in the professionalization process. This interrogation 
was motivated by a concern that there is a tension between ethics and training in the 
military, a tension between how military professionals are expected to behave and 
how military professionals do behave, a tension that has led to not only these ethical 
and legal violations, but also to what has been diagnosed as PTSD. In order to carry 
out this interrogation, I turned to the works of Martin Cook, Anthony Hartle, and J. 
Glenn Gray, as all three have previously investigated these tensions.
Cook’s focus on the confusion between how outsiders judge military professionals and 
how military professionals judge themselves revealed a need for military academies to 
help military professionals not only be able to behave as required, but to understand 
why such behavior was required in order to better adapt to changing circumstances. 
However, Hartle’s focus on the tensions between those who have been called to serve 
in the military and the rest of society helped to reveal that being a military profession-
al is not only a matter of behavior and of self-understanding, but also of identity. By 
connecting Cook’s discussion of the oft-heard complaint among military profession-
als that “this isn’t what I signed up for” to Hartle’s discussion of how alienation helps 
to create the culture of the military profession, I attempted to deepen this concept of 
identity to show how we could understand identity in an existential sense: in the sense 
of trying to find one’s place in the world, of trying to be at home in the world.
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Using the example of Carl Cranston, I further attempted to show how what is typi-
cally diagnosed as symptoms of PTSD could instead be understood as a result of the 
existential crisis of not being at home in the world; an existential crisis created in part 
precisely by being judged by others in accordance with standards of behavior with 
which military professionals do not identify. Yet, because these standards are—accord-
ing to the just war theory of Michael Walzer, to the theory of ethical warfare taught in 
military academies—derived from “common morality,” then to not identify with these 
standards is to risk not only being seen as immoral, but as inhuman.
Turning finally to the work of J. Glenn Gray, and in particular the conflict between 
Gray and Walzer on self- vs. social-judgment, we were able to better understand both 
the dangers of holding military professionals to such externally-imposed standards, 
and why we should instead strive for internally-imposed, individually-realized stan-
dards of behavior. However, Gray’s advocacy for an individualistic morality that har-
kens back to the Ancient Greek concept of “artistry,” of becoming virtuous through the 
“art of living well,” requires a level of trust and a degree of freedom that Walzer, and 
likely many others, would argue is simply too impractical to implement in any educa-
tional setting, let alone in a military academy.
While Gray nevertheless does provide us with practical suggestions for promoting 
artistry through literature, role models, and through exposure to dangerous situations, 
what Gray ultimately provides us with is an ultimatum. Either we can promote genu-
ine morality, a morality that requires a seemingly impractical level of trust but which 
can produce a deep and all-encompassing level of responsibility, or we can continue to 
promote a morality of judgment, a morality that requires obedience rather than trust 
but which can produce a fear of judgment that can lead to ethical and legal violations 
as well as to diagnoses of PTSD. Preferring obedience to trust and accountability to 
responsibility, may make us feel more comfortable, but it may also create a vicious cycle 
of trying to solve crises created by the solutions of more ethics and more treatment that 
we continue to apply to these crises.
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